Coordination of private and public interests in the implementation of innovations in the case of multiple agents

Abstract

Coordination of private and public interests in the implementation of innovations in the case of multiple agents

Ninidze D.L., Usov A.B.

Incoming article date: 15.04.2020

The mathematical model of coordination of private and public interests in the implementation of innovations in the case of multiple agents is studied. It takes into account the presence of two management levels, which are a supervisor and several agents. The relationship between the supervisor and the agents is based on a hierarchy in accordance with the information regulations of Stackelberg games. The incentive method is used as a method of hierarchical management. Algorithms for constructing equilibria for different information regulations are specified. The numerical implementation of the proposed algorithms is based on simulation. The analysis of the obtained results is given.

Keywords: Stackelberg game, Stackelberg game with feedback, hierarchy, simulation, innovation, motivation, supervisor, agents